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COMPETITION IN THE ADVANCED SALE OF SERVICE CAPACITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since service production and consumption are inseparable, many service firms 
sell their capacity in advance. Consequently, the question is whether it is optimal to sell 
more or less in advance, and if so, at what price and quantity. This paper examines the 
optimality and practice of advanced sale of service capacity under duopolistic 
competition.  
 Using a game theoretic approach, the paper provides a possible explanation as to 
why, despite sophisticated practices of advanced sale in many service industries, there are 
still many other service firms that commonly do not sell in advance. It demonstrates that 
competition and market price sensitivity to a firm's capacity are two factors that can 
impact not only on a firm's decision to sell in advance, but on its pricing and capacity 
allocation decisions as well.  
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COMPETITION IN THE ADVANCED SALE OF SERVICE CAPACITY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The very act of creating a service for a customer requires the source to be present, 
either as man or machine. This means that the production and consumption of a service is 
simultaneous, as it is widely established (Zeithaml, 2006; Bruhn & Goergi, 2006; Kasper 
et al, 2006). Consequently, any sale of a service is essentially a form of advanced sale 
prior to production, even though the time in advance may be mere minutes, as in the 
purchase of a movie ticket (cf. Edgett and Parkinson, 1993). This is in contrast to goods, 
where most goods firms retain a choice of whether to sell before or after production. 
The pressure of a service firm to practice advanced selling further in advance of 
consumption is made more compelling considering that the inseparability of production 
of consumption is double edged. Not only is the firm not able to produce and store the 
service in advance, the customer is also not able to store the service in advance of 
consumption. Thus, he faces the uncertainty that the service may not be available to him 
when he requires it, especially if the service firm has limited capacity (Biyalogorsky & 
Gerstner, 2004; Ng, 2007). To alleviate that risk, he may be willing to purchase further in 
advance of consumption, as insurance (Png, 1989). 
Accordingly, it would be logical to assume that there would exist some demand at 
a time considerably in advance of production/consumption of a service. It is therefore a 
question of whether it is optimal to sell more or less considerably in advance, and if so, at 
what price and quantity. Seen in this context, advanced selling therefore becomes a 
marketing problem.  
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Our study focuses on the advanced sale of services. Specifically, we study how to 
price and how much capacity to allocate in advance, and at the time of consumption of a 
service. As research into advanced selling is still in its early stages in marketing 
literature, we would first provide some background to its practices well as the related 
research in this area. 
Many service firms practice advance selling as a norm, with some services being 
sold more than 6 months ahead of production/consumption, such as airline seats, hotel 
rooms and cruises. There are many diverse reasons why firms sell in advance. In the case 
of Eurotunnel (the operator of the Channel Tunnel), advanced selling is done for cash 
flow reasons, to maximise cash revenues so as to ease the burden of paying interests on 
huge loans (Anon, 1994).  In the TV syndication industry, lower ratings that resulted 
from an oversupply of action/adventure cartoons, prompted TV syndicates to advance sell 
an alternative softer animated series, in 1987, in order to pre-empt competition.  In the 
trade show industry, advanced sale is conducted to ease planning, and for efficiency 
reasons (Pridmore, 1987).  For the same reason, advanced sale (or “upfront” selling as it 
is termed sometimes) is also undertaken in the TV advertising industry.  Through 
advanced selling, the early monetary commitments by advertisers allows TV networks to 
plan their promotions budget based on committed revenues, to ensure that their shows 
achieve the promised ratings (Walley, 1990).  Additionally, firms advance sell to produce 
greater revenue in advance periods for customers who face uncertainty about future 
valuations. This practice is most common for firms who are assured about demand 
patterns in their business cycle (Shugan & Xie, 2004).   
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However, despite the practice in some industries to advance sell, the optimality of 
advanced selling is not unequivocal among industry members. Within the academic 
community, especially in marketing, this phenomenon has yet to be critically 
investigated. Only recently has this phenomenon been illuminated and examined (see 
Desiraju and Shugan, 1999; Shugan and Xie, 2000, 2004, 2005). Most notably, Shugan 
and Xie highlighted the superiority of advanced selling and how it offers an opportunity 
for higher profits. 
Although advanced selling itself has not been scrupulously examined, one stream 
of academic literature has accepted it as a practice. This first stream considers advanced 
sale necessary to ensure a match between supply and demand of a service at the time of 
consumption (Sasser, 1976; Shemwell & Cronin, 1994; Harris and Peacock, 1995). Since 
service firms often operate with fixed capacities that are predetermined before the onset 
of demand (Berry, Zeithaml and Parasuraman, 1984; Ng, Wirtz and Lee, 1999), matching 
the supply of service capacity to demand is a challenging task, especially when demand is 
uncertain. Yet, the matching of supply and demand is important for service firms because 
services are perishable (Desiraju and Shugan, 1999; Lee and Ng, 2000; Ng, Wirtz and 
Lee, 1999), and hence any unsold capacity is not recoverable after the date of 
consumption. Through advanced sale, studies in this stream propose that firms create new 
demand during off-peak periods (Weatherford and Pfeifer, 1994) or level out the peaks 
by moving customers to other non-peak times (Iyer et al, 2003; Dana, 1999 & 1998; 
Bateson, 1985). This can be done through time-based price discrimination, charging 
lower prices for the use of off-peak capacity and higher otherwise (Nagle & Holden, 
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1995). Although the issues investigated in this stream of literature are important, there is 
a lack of literature into how much capacity should be sold in advance and at what price. 
Closely related to this stream is another second stream of academic literature from 
the decision sciences. Research in this area proposes that customers purchase at different 
times in advance of consumption i.e. some arrive early and some arrive later (closer to 
consumption date). The challenge to the firm is how to optimise revenue by pricing 
and/or setting capacities to be sold at each point in advance, taking into account the 
arrival times of the customers. Commonly labeled as yield or revenue management, such 
practices have successfully increased the revenues of service firms through the increasing 
use of sophisticated and computerised yield management systems (Kimes, 2000, Talluri 
et al, 2006). For example, since the USA deregulated the airline industry in 1978, many 
airlines report increases in revenue of five (5) percent or more after starting a yield 
management programme (Lloyds, 1985, Kimes, 1989). In a 1998 report, it was reported 
that American Airlines’ yield management system (YMS) generated close to $1 billion of 
incremental revenue per annum (Cook, 1998). Similarly, Chase (1999) states that firms 
who invest in revenue management systems have seen their revenues increase by as much 
as 7% with minimum capital outlay resulting in 50%-100% increase in profits. With 
newer technology and powerful programming, we find increasing service firms relying 
on YMS to assist with optimizing revenue. Therefore it is not surprising that retailers 
were reported to have spent about $30 billion for the year 2001 improving their IT 
capabilities in order to compete more effectively in the world of revenue management 
(Raman et al, 2001). Since then, academic literature on revenue management have also 
grown extensively.  
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However, with few exceptions, current understanding of revenue management is 
largely on a computational and operational level, with literature dominated by the field of 
operations management. Thus, most of the studies often focus on optimisation rather than 
marketing issues (Ng, 2007). Strategic interactions between a firm and its customers have 
also been largely ignored. In addition, existing research is mainly concerned with 
monopolistic situations.  
The difference between the first and the second stream of research is explained as 
follows. The first stream deals with selling a service in advance (and thus influencing 
demand) for consumption at various times that a service is offered, commonly labelled as 
de-marketing. The second addresses the issue of selling in advance a service that is to be 
consumed at one specified time. To illustrate the distinction, a hotel room on the Friday 
night of a long weekend is greatly sought after, compared to the same hotel room the day 
before.  The first stream deals with how to level demand, through advanced sale, for that 
Friday night, such that any excess demand can be pushed to other nights. The second 
addresses the issue of how to price Friday night’s room in advance, according to the 
different purchase times of the customers. In other words, while both streams deal with 
price discrimination based on time; the first stream discriminates on time of use whilst 
the second discriminates on the time of purchase.  
Our work is more relevant to the second stream and accordingly, to the extensive 
literature on revenue management. However, even though we also investigate the 
price/capacity allocation problem, ours differ in a number of important ways.  
First, we maintain that it is not sufficient to examine revenue management as an 
operational or optimisation issue. Since revenue management fundamentally brings in the 
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pricing behaviour of firms, concepts of consumer behaviour should be incorporated. 
Accordingly, we incorporate the use of a demand function in our model and investigate 
the market price sensitivity to capacity. In doing so, we aim to provide a deeper 
understanding of advanced sale at a theoretical level.  To our knowledge, it is the first 
time any such investigation has been conducted. Thus, we have kept the model simple 
and free of abstractions and suggest a perspective for future research in this area.  
Second, our study does not pre-suppose the optimality of advanced sale. In so 
doing, our study uncovers another reason why a service firm may want to sell in advance. 
When a firm sells part of its capacity in advance, the contraction in the overall capacity 
available pushes prices up at the time of consumption, increasing overall profits. In light 
of this, advanced sale does not necessarily require demand at the point of 
consumption/production to be uncertain. We also show that, under certain conditions, it 
may not be optimal for a firm to sell in advance but sell only close to the time of 
consumption. 
Third, we also examine how competition impacts the capacity allocations in 
advance, and the optimality of such a practice, from an economic perspective, following a 
game theoretic approach.  
Our study presents a model of advanced sale, in which the competing firms 
choose simultaneously, in Cournot (1838) style, their capacity allocations for advanced 
sale.  This is followed by their choice, simultaneously, of capacity allocations for sale at 
the time of consumption.  In our model, prices are endogenous on the capacity allocations 
of the firms.  We examine the cases when the firms’ response functions are symmetric 
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and when they are asymmetric, which capture the situations when the firms are identical 
and differentiated respectively. 
Although one would expect that firms would react to competition by selling more 
in advance, we show that competition results in a reduction of the total capacities 
allocated for advanced sale. The proportion of a firm’s total capacity allocated for 
advanced sale is also reduced, when faced with competition.  This is because of the 
interactions of several market forces.  While competitive pressure may drive the firms to 
sell in advance to avoid the risk of losing sales to the competitor, the reduced profit 
margins for advanced sale causes them to decrease their capacity allocations for sale at 
that time.  On the other hand, while higher profit margins at the time of consumption 
induces the firms to increase capacity allocations for sale at that time, the price sensitivity 
of the market prevents the firms from allocating excessive capacities for sale at that time. 
Competition also results in a firm, whose response function is more price- 
sensitive, allocating less capacity for both advanced sale and sale at the time of 
consumption.  This is because, for a firm whose response function is more price-
sensitive, an increase in capacity allocations in both times of sale reduces its prices more 
than those of a firm whose response function is less price-sensitive.  Indeed, the ratio of a 
firm’s capacity allocation for advanced sale to its allocation for sale at the time of 
consumption decreases with increased price sensitivity of the market to its capacity 
supplies.  As its response function becomes increasingly price sensitive, the firm’s 
capacity allocation for advanced sale approaches zero.  In the next section, a review of 
relevant literature is presented, followed by the specification of the model.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As advanced sale has not, until only very recently, been thought of as a marketing 
phenomenon, the literature in this field has been greatly dominated by the operations 
management research. We now present a review of the relevant studies. 
The objective of revenue management studies is to maximise yield by managing 
the sale of service capacity over time, through pricing, capacity allocation, and timing of 
sale (Desiraju & Shugan, 1999, Chase, 1999, Kimes, 2000, Boyd & Bilegan, 2003). Very 
broadly, research in this area can be further categorised into two streams. The first stream 
focuses on the pricing of service capacity over time, to maximise yield (e.g. see Bitran & 
Caldentey, 2003, Orkin, 1988 for a review of such practices).  For example, several 
studies have examined how a firm should price over time, given a demand profile 
forecast (Elmaghraby & Keskinock, 2003, Fleischmann et al, 2004, Burger & Fuchs, 
2005), and given information updates when the demand profile is stochastic (Pfeifer, 
1989).  Chiang et al (2007) provides a comprehensive review of revenue management 
practices. 
The second stream of yield management research focuses on a firm’s reservation 
policies, which include booking and overbooking policies - i.e. confirming reservations 
from customers in excess of available service capacity.  For example, various authors 
have examined how firms could insure themselves against no-shows or cancellations by 
consumers, through appropriate reservation policies and inventory optimisation 
(Bertsimas & Popescu, 2003; Pak & Piersma, 2002; McGill & Van Ryszin, 1999). Early 
researchers in this area including Alstrup et al. (1986), Belobaba (1989), Hersh and 
Ladany (1978), Ladany (1976), Lieberman and Yechiali (1978), Pfeifer (1989), Rothstein 
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(1971, 1974, 1985), Thompson (1961) and Toh (1985) have also examined the pricing 
implications associated with such policies. 
In the majority of these studies, the yield management problem is structured as 
one in which firms maximise payoffs/yield, given some forecasted demand profile (e.g. 
Badinelli and Olsen, 1990; Belobaba, 1989; Bodily and Weatherford, 1995; Hersh and 
Ladany, 1978; Pfeifer, 1989; Toh, 1979). Over time, increasingly complex demand 
profiles, which require increasingly sophisticated mathematical procedures or algorithms 
to obtain solutions, have been introduced and investigated (e.g. Feng & Xiao, 2000, 2001, 
2006; Bertsimas & Boer, 2005; Weatherford & Polt, 2002; Pak & Peirsma, 2002; 
Brumelle & Walczak, 2003). For the purpose of this paper, we have chosen not to review 
the methods employed by the studies in operations research as the mathematical focus of 
these studies have little relevance to the issues investigated in our study. It has to be 
noted though, that with a few exceptions (i.e. Desiraju and Shugan, 1999; Lee and Ng, 
2000; Png, 1989, 1991; Shugan and Xie, 2000; Xie and Shugan, 2001), current 
understanding of yield management is largely on a computational and operational level 
with little regard for economic and marketing theories (Desiraju and Shugan, 1999; Ng, 
2007).  In addition, other than the studies by Png (1989, 1991), Desiraju and Shugan 
(1999), Shugan and Xie (2000), and Xie and Shugan (2001), current research does not 
examine explicitly the strategic interactions between a firm and its customers.  Instead, 
yield management systems (YMS) in general assume an exogenous demand profile, and 
hence ignore the potential impact of a firm’s actions (specifically capacity allocations) on 
the demand profile.  What is more, existing studies have also overlooked the strategic 
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interactions between competing firms and how such interactions may impact the firms’ 
strategies in advanced sale (Shugan & Xie, 2004 & 2005; Williams, 1999). 
Recognising these limitations, some researchers have suggested that a more 
thorough understanding of advanced sale at a conceptual level is required, and that the 
demand characteristics, upon which revenue management studies are premised, be based 
on fundamental concepts of consumer behaviour (Chase, 1999; Lieberman, 1993; 
Relihan, 1989).  Consistent with such views, there are few studies that have been 
conducted.  For example, Png (1989) examined the advanced sale of service capacity 
when consumers are risk-averse, and suggested that such consumers purchase in advance 
as an insurance against the uncertainty of service availability. Ng (2007) termed these 
phenomena as the valuation risk or an the acquisition risk of the customer. Valuation risk 
depends on the consumers’ willingness to pay for a service in advance while facing 
uncertainty of consumption while acquisition risk is associated with the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for a service in advance to guarantee the future availability of the 
service. Given that this is so, firms can therefore maximise their profits by selling in 
advance and charging a price premium for advanced sale, whilst discounting prices as the 
date of consumption approaches (Png, 1991).  A study by Desiraju and Shugan (1999) 
examined the conditions for the use of yield management systems vis-à-vis more 
simplified pricing systems.  Shugan and Xie (2000, 2004, 2005) also examined how 
profits can be improved by advanced sale. In that study, the authors explore the 
separation of consumption and advanced purchase for services and how such a separation 
can provide a price discrimination opportunity to increase profits. More recently, Xie and 
Shugan (2001, 2004, 2005) provide an extensive paper on when and how firms should 
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advance sell while  Lee and Ng (2001) investigated the impact of price sensitivity on 
pricing and capacity allocations in advanced sale.  In contrast to Png’s (1991) result, Lee 
and Ng showed that price discounting in advanced sale is optimal when consumers’ price 
sensitivity is taken into account. The study also showed that while it is commonly 
believed that advance selling stems from demand uncertainty at time of consumption, or 
is motivated by competitive pre-emption (McKenna, 1989), the findings show that even 
when uncertainty is absent, advanced selling is optimal. This is because when no 
advanced sale is undertaken the large amount of capacity available at the point of 
consumption drives prices down.  However, with advanced sale, the capacity that is sold 
in advance (even though at a lower price) serves to reduce the capacity availability at the 
time of consumption, thus driving prices up at that time.  The overall effect is that 
capacity utilisation is improved, and profits are increased. Anjos et. al. (2005) similarly 
showed that under certain assumptions about customers’ price sensitivity, the prices 
charged should increase as the consumption date approaches. 
This study provides an explanation for the practice of advance selling of TV 
advertising slots in the USA, as reported earlier.  TV networks typically sell 75%-80% of 
their season’s advertisement capacity months before the advertisements are aired.  The 
remaining capacity is held back for quarterly “scatter” markets, where prices are much 
higher because there is less capacity available to meet demand (Mandese, 1995). 
This paper extends Lee and Ng’s study to examine how competition impacts 
advanced sale of service capacity.  This is in contrast to existing studies, which are 
mainly concerned with monopolistic situations.  Similar to Png’s study (1989, 1991), we 
examine the optimality of advanced sale from an economic perspective, following a game 
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theoretic approach.  In terms of model structure, ours differs from that of Png’s (1989, 
1991) and Desaraju and Shugan’s (1999) in significant ways.  Compared to Desiraju and 
Shugan’s (1999) model, which assumes a two-segment market, our formulation is based 
on a Cournot (1838)-type response function that captures the price-volume relationship 
for a given market.  This is important for “understanding the impact of changing prices 
on the demand for a product or service” (Montgomery, 1988, p. 53).  Doing so, we are 
also able to investigate how asymmetric price sensitivities impact the firms’ decisions in 
competition. 
Firms in our model compete by choosing capacity allocations for advanced sale 
and for sale at the time of consumption.  We do not place any restrictions on demand, as 
we are also interested in examining the impact of advanced sale on capacity utilisation.  
This is in contrast to Png’s (1991) model, which assumes that demand outstrips capacity; 
hence the issue of excess capacity does not arise.  Our study also differs from those that 
examine pricing strategies (e.g. peak load pricing or similar techniques) that aim to 
influence demand across time (or service delivery/consumption dates) to improve 
demand-supply match (e.g. Dana, 1999; Nagle & Holden, 1995; Radas, 1998).  While the 
focus of these studies is on pricing for multiple service delivery/consumption dates, our 
focus is on pricing for a single particular service delivery/consumption date that is sold at 
different times.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  We present our model formulation 
in §3.  This is followed by the analyses, which are presented in §4.  §5 discusses our 
results and the managerial implications, and the final section contains some concluding 
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remarks and provides directions for future research.  All proofs to the propositions are 
contained in the appendix. 
 
3. MODEL 
Consider a market, or a specific segment as defined by its demand function 
(Dickson and Ginter, 1987; Mahajan and Jain, 1978), with two service firms - for 
example two hotels, in competition.  In deciding whether to sell in advance, the firms 
have to decide on the price and capacity to allocate for advanced sale.  Since this study is 
an attempt to structure a conceptual model of advanced sale, we define advanced sale to 
include all forms of advance bookings that are binding and that all such sale is consumed 
(see Dana 1999), and there are no other abstractions such as cancellations or no-shows. 
We also assume that there are no price changes after the reservations are confirmed.  
We structure our model following that of Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983), in that 
firms in our model choose capacity allocations in a Cournot-type game played over two 
periods.  In period 1, the firms decide simultaneously on the capacity allocation for 
advanced sale.  This is followed by period 2, in which they decide simultaneously on the 
capacity allocation for sale at the time of consumption.  Hence, in contrast to Kreps and 
Scheinkman’s (1983) model, in which the firms choose capacities followed by prices, 
firms in our model choose capacities in both periods. 
Let t ∈ {tA, t0} be the time to the consumption date, t0 (when t = 0) be the time of 
production/consumption, and tA (such that tA > t0 = 0) be the time of advanced sale.  At t0, 
the service is produced and consumed, and any unused capacity that arises has no salvage 
value after t0.  We assume that tA and t0 are exogenous.  In practice, tA is industry specific 
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and depends on consumers’ willingness to purchase a service prior to the date of 
consumption.  For example, in the hotel and airline industries, firms are known to sell 
their capacities more than a year in advance in some markets (Lee and Ng, 2000), hence 
tA is more than a year in these industries.  Whilst in the advertising industry, TV networks 
are known to sell their advertising spaces approximately 6 months in advance (Mandese, 
1995), hence tA represents 6 months in advance in such industries. We also assume that 
any sales are only made at tA and t0 and all advance sales are conducted at tA and all spot 
sales are at t0.Let Ci be the fixed cost of operation for firm i.  We assume that the variable 
cost of capacity is sufficiently small to be ignored.  This is because, in capacity-sensitive 
service firms in general, the fixed cost of operation of service firms is much higher than 
the variable cost of capacity.  This is especially so in the airlines and hotel industries 
(Kimes, 1989; Desiraju and Shugan, 1999).  Let k0i and P0i be the capacity and the price 
of a unit capacity, respectively, at the time of consumption t0 for firm i, where i = 1, 2.  
Similarly, let kAi and PAi be the capacity and the price of a unit capacity, respectively, at 
the time of advanced sale tA for firm i.  Let pii be the payoffs of firm i.  A firm i chooses 
capacities ki = {kAi, k0i} to maximise profits. Assuming there is no discount factor, the 
firm’s objective function can thus be defined as, 
 
(1) Max.k pii = Max.k [(PAikAi  + P0ik0i) – Ci]  
 
We assume that price is a linear decreasing function of total capacity available at 
any point of time t, as follows. 
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(2) PAi = α - βi(kA1+kA2+k01+k02)  
(3) P0i = α - βi(k01+k02)   
 
We will first examine the case when the firms are identical.  In this case, the 
firms’ response functions are similar, and hence the price sensitivities (βi) are symmetric 
across the firms, βi = βj = β, i ≠ j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.   Following which, we examine the case 
when the firms are differentiated, with differing response functions such that the price 
sensitivities across the firms are asymmetric, βi ≠ βj. 
The use of a linear demand function is consistent with earlier game theoretic 
studies (e.g. Ingene and Parry, 1995; Jeuland and Shugan, 1983).  Such functions have 
also been extensively used in empirical studies (see Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy, 1992).  
The linear demand function can be a reasonable approximation of a non-linear one, given 
that the latter can be defined as one that comprises a series of linear functions (f(x) = ∑i 
fi(x): xj ≤ x ≤ xk, i = 1 to n, j ≠ k) over an appropriately partitioned (xj ≤ x ≤ xk) non-linear 
one, such that the range of each partition approaches zero (ie. (xk - xj) → 0).  The 
accuracy of a linear function as an approximation of a non-linear one thus depends on 
how the non-linear function is partitioned and the range of interest. 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
We first consider the case of a monopoly to provide a benchmark for comparisons 
later.  This is followed by the case of duopolistic competition.  Finally, we extend the 
analysis to examine the impact of asymmetric price sensitivities on pricing and capacity 
allocations for advanced sale, and for sale at the time of consumption. 
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(a) Symmetric Price Sensitivity, (βi = βj = β) 
For the case of a monopoly, the firm’s response functions at time tA and t0, and its 
objective function, are as follows. 
 
(4) PA = α - β(kA + k0) 
(5) P0 = α - β(k0) 
(6) Max.k pi = Max.k [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] 
 
As with our previous study (Lee and Ng, 2000), we focus only on the case when 
an interior solution exists.  This is important in order to determine the extent of demand 
for a service when there are no constraints (Orkin, 1998).  Hence, we assume that the 
optimal capacity allocation k* = (k0
* + kA
*) is within the limit of the firm’s total capacity 
K, i.e. k* ≤ K.  Otherwise, the results will be driven by boundary conditions. This also 
implies that the firm would not be pricing down to fill remaining capacity since the 
marginal revenue in doing so would be negative. Solving the firm’s payoff function, 
Lemma 1 follows, which describes the monopolist’s optimal strategy in advanced sale. 
 
Lemma 1: The monopolist’s optimal strategy in advanced sale is such that k0
*
 = 
α/(3β), kA* = α/(3β), P0* =(2α)/3, PA* = α/3, and pi* = [(α2/(3β))  – C]. 
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Lemma 1 implies that a monopolist will allocate its capacity symmetrically over 
sale in advance and sale at the time of consumption, (k0
* = kA
* = α/3β), and discount its 
prices for advanced sale such that PA
* = α/3 < P0* = 2α/3. 
 In the case of duopolistic competition, when βi = βj = β, the firms’ response 
functions are as follows. 
 
(7) PAi = PA = α - β(kA1+kA2+k01+k02) 
(8) P0i = P0 = α - β(k01+k02) 
 
 In accordance to the criteria of the sub game perfection (e.g. Rasmusen, 1994), we 
shall first derive the firms’ optimal capacity allocations for advanced sale, given the firms’ 
capacity allocation at the time of consumption (i.e. kAi*k0).  Lemma 2 follows, which 
describes the solution kAi*k0. 
 
Lemma 2: kAi*k0 = [α - β(k01 + k02)]/(3β), where k0 = {k01, k02}. 
 
 
 Given the solution kAi*k0, we proceed to solve for the firms’ optimal capacity 
allocations at the time of consumption, following which we can derive the Nash (1950) 
equilibrium in capacity allocations for sale in advance and at the time of consumption. 
 
Lemma 3: The Nash equilibrium is such that for sale at t0: k01* = k02* = α/(3β), 
and P01* = P02* = α/3, and for sale at tA: kA1* = kA2* = α/(9β), and PA1* = PA2* 
= α/9.  The firms’ equilibrium payoffs are pi1* = pi2* = [α2(10/81) – C]. 
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From Lemma 1 and 3, it is immediately obvious that the total capacities allocated 
for sale at time of consumption is higher under duopolistic competition (k01
* + k02
* = 
2α/3β), compared to that under a monopoly (k0* = α/3β). 
 
Proposition 1: (k01
*
 + k02
*
) = 2α/3β, under duopolistic competition, compared to 
k0
*
 = α/3β, under a monopoly.  
 
 
However, the total capacities allocated for advanced sale is lower under 
duopolistic competition (kA1
* + kA2
* = 2α/9β), compared to that under a monopoly (kA* = 
α/3β). 
 
Proposition 2: (kA1
*
 + kA2
*
) = 2α/9β, under duopolistic competition, compared to 
kA
*
 = α/3β, under a monopoly. 
 
This is rather surprising, as intuitively, we would expect that the firms would 
increase their capacity allocations for advanced sale under competitive pressure (See 
McKenna, 1989), to sell capacity earlier than their rivals.  However, advanced sale 
fetches a price lower than that under sale at the time of consumption, PA1* = PA2* = α/9 < 
P01* = P02* = α/3 (Lemma 3).  Hence, while competitive pressure would motivate the 
firms to sell in advance in order to avoid the risk of lost sales, the reduced profit margins 
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causes them to decrease capacity allocations for advanced sale.  Furthermore, the higher 
profit margins at the time of consumption would also induce the firms to increase 
capacity allocations for sale at that time (Quain, Sansbury and Quinn, 1999).  However, 
the market price sensitivity to the total capacity allocations at the time of consumption 
prevents the firms from allocating excessive capacities for sale at that time.  The overall 
effect of the interactions of these forces is therefore a reduction in the proportion of a 
firm’s total capacity allocated for advanced sale under duopolistic competition (kAi
*/(k0i
* 
+ kAi
*) = ¼), compared to that under a monopoly (kA
*/(k0
* + kA*) = ½). 
 
Proposition 3: kAi
*/(k0i
* + kAi
*) = ¼, under duopolistic competition, compared to 
kA
*/(k0
* + kA
*) = ½, under a monopoly. 
 
(b) Asymmetric Price Sensitivity, (βi ≠ βj) 
 We shall now investigate how asymmetric price sensitivities impact the firms’ 
decisions on advanced sale. In this case, βi ≠ βj, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, which implies that PAi ≠ PAj, 
and P0i ≠ P0j.  Let β1 = βH and β2 = βL, such that βL< βH, without loss of generality.  The 
inequality β1 = βH > β2 = βL implies that the market is more price sensitive to capacity 
allocations by firm 1 than by firm 2, which reflects that firms 1 and 2 are differentiated.  
Lemma 4 presents the Nash equilibrium for this case. 
 
Lemma 4: The Nash equilibrium is such that: 
• for sale at t0: k0H*= (2αβL - αβH)/(3βHβL), k0L*= (2αβH - αβL)/(3βHβL), and 
P0H
* = (2αβL - αβH)/(3βL), P0L*= (2αβH - αβL)/(3βH) 
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• for sale at tA: kAH* = (5αβL - 4αβH)/(9βHβL), kAL* = (5αβH - 4αβL)/(9βHβL), 
and PAH
*
 = (5αβL - 4αβH)/(9βL), PAL* = (5αβH - 4αβL)/(9βH) 
The equilibrium payoffs are piH* = [(61α2βL2 - 76α2βHβL + 25α2βH2)/(81βHβL2) – 
C] and piL* = [(61α2βH2 - 76α2βHβL + 25α2βL2)/(81βH2βL) – C]. 
 
When price sensitivities are asymmetric, βi ≠ βj, optimal pricing and capacity 
allocations differ across the firms.  
 
Proposition 4: PAH
* < PAL
*, P0H
* < P0L
*, and (P0H
* - PAH
*) = (P0L
* - PAL
*) = [(αβL 
+ αβH)]/(9βL)]. 
 
 
As expected, a firm charges a lower price for both advanced sale and sale at the 
time of consumption, if its response function is more price sensitive, PAH
* < PAL
*, and 
P0H
* < P0L
*.  In addition, as the market is price sensitive to the combined capacities of 
both the firms, rather than to just the capacity allocations of any one firm, the price 
reduction for advanced sale is similar across both the firms, (P0H
* - PAH
*) = (P0L
* - PAL
*). 
 
Proposition 5: kAH
* < kAL
*, k0H
* < k0L
*, and ∂(kAi*/k0i*)/∂βi < 0. 
 
 
Although the optimal price for the firm with higher price sensitivity is lower, and 
therefore we expect the capacity allocation to be higher, the derivation shows that the 
firm should allocate less capacity for both advanced sale and sale at the time of 
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consumption, if its response function is more price sensitive.  Indeed, the ratio of a firm’s 
capacity allocation for advanced sale to its allocation for sale at the time of consumption 
(kAi
*/k0i), decreases with increased price sensitivity of the market to its capacity supplies 
(∂(kAi*/k0i*)/∂βi < 0).  Although counter intuitive, this can be explained as follows.  The 
firms’ prices are reduced as their capacity allocations for sale increases.  However, for a 
firm whose response function is more price sensitive, an increase in capacity allocations 
in both times of sale reduces its prices more than those of a firm whose response function 
is less price sensitive.  Hence, a firm whose response function is more price sensitive, 
would reduce its capacity allocations and allocate less capacity for both times of sale than 
one whose response function is less price sensitive.   
In addition, a firm whose response function is more price sensitive commands 
lower prices for both times of sale, but sale at the time of consumption carries a price 
premium over that in advance.  Such a firm would therefore reduce its capacity allocation 
for advanced sale, preferring to sell more at the time of consumption, in order to benefit 
from the higher prices obtainable at that time.  It follows that the ratio of a firm’s capacity 
allocation for advanced sale to its allocation for sale at the time of consumption decreases 
with an increase in price sensitivity.  Indeed, as a firm’s response function becomes 
increasingly price sensitive, in the limit when βH → 5βL/4, the firm’s capacity allocation 
for advanced sale approaches zero, kAH
* → 0. 
 
Proposition 6: kAH
*
 → 0, as βH → 5βL/4. 
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This proposition implies that under conditions of extreme price sensitivities, it can 
be sub-optimal for a service firm to sell any capacity in advance. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The surge of affordable information technology and its advancement over the last 
decade have accelerated the development of computational algorithms for revenue 
management programme.  This has resulted in an increased adoption of revenue 
management programmes by many other services sectors such as restaurants (Kimes, 
1999), rail, (Anonymous, 1999), car rental (Geraghty and Johnson, 1997), air cargo 
(Kasilingam, 1997), bulk power (Anonymous, 1997), and electricity (Ashworth, 1997).  
However, our analysis raises several concerns about the use of such programmes, which 
service firms should be aware of.  
Through our simple stylised model we show that the total capacity allocated for 
advanced sale is lower under duopolistic competition, compared to that under a 
monopoly (Proposition 2).  Individually, each competing firm reduces the proportion of 
its total capacity allocated for advanced sale (Proposition 3).  These suggest that the use 
of revenue management systems could potentially lead to sub-optimal capacity 
allocations by firms in competition such that excessive capacity is being offered for sale 
in advance.  This is because revenue management systems in general “treat quantity 
demanded as a random variable drawn from distributions whose parameters are estimated 
from historical figures and conditioned on the firm’s (and competitor’s) product price and 
availability decisions” (Williams, 1999, p. 40).  This implies that decisions that are based 
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on revenue management systems implicitly ignore competitive interactions and consider 
only monopolistic situations.  From Propositions 2 and 3, Corollary 1 thus follows.  
 
Corollary 1: Decisions based on YMS, which fail to take into explicit account of 
competitive interactions, are sub-optimal in that excessive capacity is allocated 
for advanced sale. 
 
 
Our study also implies that a firm’s advanced sale strategy in terms of capacity 
allocations depends on how sensitive its prices are to the total capacity available in the 
market (Proposition 5).  In this regard, a service firm whose prices are less (more) 
sensitive to the total market capacity should increase (decrease) its capacity allocated for 
advanced sale.  
 
Corollary 2: A service firm whose prices are less (more) sensitive to the total market 
capacity should increase (decrease) its capacity allocated for advanced sale. 
 
  
Indeed, our analysis shows that, for firms whose prices are highly sensitive to the 
total market capacity, such firms should avoid advanced sale altogether (Proposition 6). 
 
Corollary 3: Advanced sale is suitable for service firms whose prices are less 
sensitive to the total market capacity, but not for those whose prices are very 
sensitive to the total market capacity. 
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Corollary 3 also implies that it is important that revenue management systems 
take into account, not only competitive interactions, but also the relative price 
sensitivities, to the total market supply, of the firms in competition.  Failure to do so 
could lead to sub-optimal decisions in capacity allocations for advanced sale.  This is in 
direct contrast to Belobaba’s (1989) assertion that “…although pricing has a direct impact 
on revenues, an airline can seldom impose price changes without taking the reactions of 
its competitors into account.  Seat inventory control, on the other hand, is a tactical 
component of revenue management that is entirely under the control of each individual” 
(p. 183).  This suggests (incorrectly) that capacity allocations can be made 
monopolistically. 
 
Corollary 4: Failure by revenue management systems to take into account both 
competitive interactions and the relative price sensitivities of the competing firms 
could lead to sub-optimal decisions in capacity allocations for advanced sale. 
 
 
In some industries, service firms, which are aware that the market is price 
sensitive to capacity availability, have attempted to conceal the actual capacity available 
so as to be able to command better prices.  For example, in the airline industry, most of 
the firms’ capacities (seats) are sold through travel agents using a computer reservation 
system (CRS).  In using the CRS, the total number of seats available is not shown when 
capacity availability is high.  However, if only a limited number of seats are still 
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available, then the exact number is reported by the CRS. Such a “cloaking” strategy can 
be effective for service firms whose prices are highly sensitive to capacity availability. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of advanced sale in services marketing has been largely 
overlooked by the academic community in marketing. With the advent of the new 
economy, dominated by services and highly competitive in nature, it is our contention 
that this area of research should not be ignored. In this paper, we set out to investigate the 
phenomenon and the impact of competition on this practice. We have done this in the 
context of a Cournot duopoly model over two stages of time. Where previous studies of 
this nature assumed some demand profile in advance, our study explicitly models the 
market price sensitivity to capacity and the effects of competition, highlighting the 
marketing issues relevant to advanced sale. 
In our view, our paper answers a few questions. Is advanced selling optimal? We 
discover that it is, even when no uncertainty is present. Is it optimal when there is 
competition?  The answer we find is also largely yes, but depending on the level of price 
sensitivity relative to the competitor, and even where there is advanced sale, there should 
be a reduction in capacity from what is allocated under a monopoly context. However, 
this paper raises more questions than it answers definitively. What would happen when 
uncertainty is introduced? Since we have examined the impact of price sensitivity and 
competition on the advanced sale strategies of competing firms, a natural extension of 
this study is to investigate how demand uncertainty affects advanced sale.  How would 
the impact of competition be if the firms can choose the time of selling in advance? In 
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our model, competing firms choose capacity allocations for advanced sale and for sale at 
the time of consumption.  We assumed that the time for advanced sale is exogenous, and 
that prices are endogenous to the firms’ capacity allocations.  However, effective pricing 
and timing decisions, in addition to the proper allocation of capacities for sale over time, 
are also important in improving revenue from yield management.  Future research effort 
should therefore be devoted to investigating the optimal timing of advanced sale for 
competing firms, as well as how price (instead of capacity) setting would impact on the 
practice. 
 Method-wise, we adopted a game theoretic approach to examine the optimality of 
advanced sale for competing firms.  The use of game theory, which is referred to as 
interactive decision theory (Aumann, 1989), provides us with a systematic way of 
analyzing problems that involve strategic interactions between competing firms.  We 
hope our paper will provide greater stimulus to researchers in service marketing to 
perform theoretical research based on deductive science, to further increase the rigour of 
research in service marketing. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Substitute equation (4) and (5) for PA and P0 respectively, into the objective function (6), 
to obtain pi = [(α - β(kA + k0))kA + (α - β(k0))k0]– C.  Hence, FOC wrt kA: 0 = α - 2βkA - 
βk0, and FOC wrt k0: 0 = α - 2βk0 - βkA.  Solving the FOCs: k0* = α/3β and kA* = α/3β. 
Substitute k0
* and kA
* into equations (4) and (5): P0
* = 2α/3, and PA*= α/3.  Hence, pi* = 
(α/3)(α/3β) + (2α/3)(α/3β) – C = (α2/3β) – C.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
pii = PAikAi+P0ik0i-C ⇒ pii = [α - β(kAi+kAj+k0i+k0j)]kAi +P0ik0i-C for firm i.  FOC wrt kAik0: 
kAi = (α-βkAj-βk0i-βk0j)/2β ⇒ kAi*k0 = (α - β(k0i + k0j)]/(3β).  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 3 
At t0, pi0i = P0ik0i-C ⇒ pi0i = [α - β(k0i+k0j)]k0i for firm i.  FOC wrt k0i: k0i=(α-βk0j)/2β ⇒ 
k01
* = k02
* = α/3β.  Substitute k01* and k02* into (8) ⇒ P01* = P02* = α/3.  Substitute k01*, k02*, 
into kAik0 (Lemma 2): kA1* = kA2* = α/9β.  Substitute kA1*, kA2* into (7) ⇒ PA1* = PA2* = 
α/9.  Substituting PAi*, kAi*, P0i*, k0i* into pii ⇒ pi1* = pi2* = 10α2/81 - C.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From Lemma 3: k01
* = k02
* = α/3β ⇒ k01*+k02* = 2α/3β for a duopoly.  From Lemma 1, 
k*0 = α/3β for a monopoly.  Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
From Lemma 3, kA1
* = kA2
* = α/9β ⇒ kA1*+kA2* = 2α/9β for a duopoly.  From Lemma 1, 
k*A = α/3β for a monopoly.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 33 
From Lemma 1, for a monopoly, k*A = α/3β and k*0  = α/3β, hence kA*/(k0* + kA*) = ½.  
From Lemma 3, for duopoly, kAi
* =  α/9β  and k0i* = α/3β, hence kAi*/(k0i* + kAi*) = ¼.  
Q.E.D.  
Proof of Lemma 4 
Given that PAH = α - βH(kAH+kAL+k0H+k0L), P0H = α - βH(k0H+k0L), PAL = α - 
βL(kAH+kAL+k0H+k0L), P0L = α - βL(k0H+k0L), then from objective function (6), piH = (α - 
βH(kAH+kAL+k0H+k0L))kAH + (α - βH(k0H+k0L))k0H]– C.  FOC: kAH = (α-βHkAL-βHk0H-
βHk0L)/2βH, and kAL = (α-βLkAH-βLk0L-βLk0H)/2βL, which imply that kAH*k0 = (2αβL-
αβH-βHβLk0L-βH βLk0H)/3βHβL and kAL*k0 = (2αβH-αβL-βLβHk0H-βLβHk0L)/3βHβL.  pi0H 
= [α - βH(k0H+k0L)]k0H ⇒ FOC wrt k0H: k0H=(α-βHk0L)/2βH.  Similarly, solve for firm L 
to get k0L=(α-βLk0L)/2βL. Hence, k0H* = (2αβL-αβH)/3βHβL and k0L* = (2αβH-αβL)/3βHβL.  
Substitute k0H
* and k0L
* into kAH
*k0 and kAL*k0 ⇒ kAH* = (5αβL-4αβH)/9βHβL and kAL* 
= (5αβH-4αβL)/9βHβL.  Substitute kAH* kAL* k0H* k0L* into response functions at tA and t0 
to obtain PAH
* = (5αβL-4αβH)/9βL, PAL*= (5αβH-4αβL)/9βH, P0L* =[(2αβH-αβL)/3βH, and 
P0H
* = [(2αβL-αβH)/3βL.  Hence, given solutions for optimal capacities and pricing, solve 
for piH* = [(61α2βL2 - 76α2βHβL + 25α2βH2)/(81βHβL2) – C] and piL* = [(61α2βH2 - 
76α2βHβL + 25α2βL2)/(81βH2βL) – C].  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Since βL < βH, Lemma 4 implies, PAH*= (5αβL-4αβH)/9βL < PAL*= (5αβH-4αβL)/9βH, and 
P0H
* = (2αβL-αβH)/3βL < P0L* = (2αβH-αβL)/3βH.  Hence, (P0H* - PAH*) = [(2αβL-
αβH)/3βL] -[(5αβL-4αβH)/9βL] = [(αβL + αβH)]/(9βL)], and (P0L* - PAL*) = [(2αβH-
αβL)/3βH] -[(5αβH-4αβL)/9βH] = [(αβL + αβH)]/(9βL)].  Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
As βL < βH, Lemma 4 implies, kAH* = (5αβL-4αβH)/9βHβL < kAL* = (5αβH-4αβL)/9βHβL, 
and k0H
* = (2αβL-αβH)/3βHβL < k0L* = (2αβH-αβL)/3βHβL.  As kAH*= (5αβL-4αβH)/9βHβL 
and k0H
*= (2αβL-αβH)/3βHβL, then kAH*/k0H* = (5αβL-4αβH) / (6αβL-3αβH) ⇒ 
∂(kAH*/k0H*)/∂βH = -9βL/(6βL-3βH)2 < 0.  Similarly, it can be shown that ∂(kAL*/k0L*)/∂βL 
< 0.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
From Lemma 4, kAH
*= (5αβL-4αβH)/9βHβL → 0, as βH → 5βL/4.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
